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I
RUGUAY IS generally thought to be the most democratic of the
Latin American nations. There one enjoys the same personal and
property freedoms that generally obtain in the United States, and
the effect of these is heightened by the fact that its population is about three
million. But Uruguay was not always so democratic. The civil peace which
is the primary cause of the well-being and contentment of the people was
gained after three-quarters of a century of struggle. Although Uruguay
became independent in 1828, it was not until 1904 that clear predominance
of national over sectional power was achieved.
Like many other Latin American nations, Uruguay adopted a first
constitution which permitted a continuance of governmental control by
representatives of groups similar to those which had been in control during
the colonial period. An indirectly elected president who possessed great
powers under the Spanish-inherited predilection for highly personalist and
absolutist government, was virtually a reincarnation of the absolute mon-
arch.’ As such, the office became the goal of many who did not hesitate
to employ violence in their pursuit of it. Latin America did not really
go though a &dquo;revolution&dquo; in the early nineteenth century; as one eminent
student of the area has said, it &dquo;seceded&dquo; from the Spanish Empire.2 2
Under these circumstances, political parties became personal organiza-
tions little disposed to peaceful rotation in office,. Civil war became a substi-
tute for elections. The continual intervention of Argentina and Brazil on
behalf of one or the other of the principal Uruguayan &dquo;political parties&dquo;
perpetuated an already anarchic condition.3 Thus supported, the parties
possessed relatively equal military force.
In order to achieve peace, it became the custom, beginning in 1851, to
draw treaties or pacts between the principal contenders for power. Thus,
in October of that year, a treaty was concluded between the Blancos,
* Research for this paper was made possible in part by a grant from the Horace H. Rackham Foundation.
1 It is paradoxically true that the hyperindividualist Latin American has allowed himself to be ensnared
into the acceptance of an absolute leader literally hundreds of times in the history of the area.
A book title by Ernest Hambloch states the matter rather well, and in terms of nearly universal
applicability: "His Majesty, the President of Brazil." This phenomenon is thoughtfully discussed
by many writers, among the best being Lionel Cecil Jane in his Liberty and Despotism in Spanish
America (Oxford: England, 1929); and Sol Tax in "The Problem of Democracy in Middle
America," American Sociological Review, X (April, 1945). 
2 Professor Irving Leonard of the University of Michigan, to the writer.
3 Pablo Blanco Acevedo, Estudios Constitucionales (Montevideo, 1939), 49-61; J. E. Pivel Devoto, Historia
de la Rep&uacute;blica Oriental del Uruguay (1830-1930) (Montevideo, 1945), 17-121; Jos&eacute; G. Antu&ntilde;a,
La junta de gobierno y el partido colorado (Montevideo, 1913), 20.
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headed by General Manuel Oribe, and the Colorados, led by General
Fructuoso Rivera.4 But while the 1851 agreement was, in many respects, a
treaty of peace, a second agreement in 1872, following another civil war,
showed those characteristics which have caused some Uruguayans to liken
the situation to the Missouri compromise in the United States. The Blancos
won a military victory over the government, controlled by the Colorados,
and, aided by the mediation of the Argentine consul in Montevideo, were
granted hegemony in four of the nineteen Departments into which the
country is divided.5 In 1897, following another period of chaos, the govern-
ment was forced to broaden the grant of control to six Departments
But the territorial apportionments of 1872 and 1897 are only sympto-
matic of deeper difficulties. The provisions of the pacts suggest the nature
of some of these other problems. However powerful they may have been
on the battlefield, the Blancos have never been able, under whatever
election laws, to elect a candidate to the presidency; they have not con-
trolled that office since 1868. They have been concerned, therefore, with
placing party representatives in other national, and in local offices. The
settlements of 1872 and 1897 contained provisions regarding election of
members of the General Assembly (the national legislature) which would
permit more Blancos to be elected than under the previous regulations.
The later pact also provided that these reforms should be extended to the
election of members of the partially autonomous Departmental &dquo;Ad-
ministrative and Economic Juntas.&dquo; 7
The Blancos were concerned with the enforcement of national laws
within those territories they controlled. Because Uruguay is a unitary
4 Oribe and the Argentine forces of Juan Manuel Rosas fought Rivera, backed by the Brazilians, for
twelve years (1839-1851) in the "Guerra Grande," which was featured by the siege of Montevideo
and intervention by the British and French fleets. As the end of the period approached, an
alliance against Rosas developed in Argentina under Justo Jos&eacute; Urquiza. Brazil supported this
alliance, and it became clear that Oribe would have to make his peace with Rivera or be wiped
out. He did so, and a triple alliance defeated Rosas at Monte Caseros, February 3, 1852. Pivel
Devoto, op. cit., 191-199; Eduardo Acevedo, Obras Hist&oacute;ricas (Montevideo, 1933), III, 351-356.
5 Eduardo Acevedo, op. cit., IV, 647-649; J. E. Pivel Devoto, Historia de los partidos politicos en el
Uruguay (A&ntilde;os 1865-1897) (Montevideo, 1943), 46-55, 106. The "Peace of April" received great
public acclaim, and became the subject of a monument erected the following year at the place of
signing, the town of San Jos&eacute;. See also Juan Andr&eacute;s Ram&iacute;rez, Sinopsis de la evoluci&oacute;n insti-
tucional (Montevideo, 1949), 106-107.
6 Eduardo Acevedo, op. cit., VI, 16-17. At pp. 116-117, the writer notes that the settlement was popularly
received, although it was a bitter pill for the government, since the president had been assassinated
after initial government refusal to negotiate. The settlement’s popularity was attested by a public
demonstration of nearly 40,000 people in the streets of Montevideo.
Elsewhere (ibid., 139), Acevedo notes that Uruguay endured forty-one revolutions in its first
seventy-one years of political independence.
7 Until the constitutional reform of 1934, Senators were elected by electoral colleges in the individual
Departments. The Blancos at least were assured Senators from those Departments which they
controlled. Further, the 1897 agreement provided that a certain minimum percentage of seats in
the Chamber of Representatives should be assigned to the minority party. In 1873 proportional
representation, as a solution to the problem of achieving adequate minority representation, was first
suggested by Professor Justino E. Jimen&eacute;z de Ar&eacute;chaga of the University of Montevideo Law School.
It was not accepted fully until 1918.
The juridical status of the 1897 settlement is evidenced by its incorporation in the semi-
official collection of statutes, Colecci&oacute;n legislativo de la Rep&uacute;blica Oriental del Uruguay. See
Colecci&oacute;n, XX, 272-277, for the text of the treaty, and ibid., XXI, 96-114 and 328-345, for the
two laws resulting from the agreement.
The pacts of 1851, 1872, and 1897 also included cash settlements to the Blanco partisans, to be
paid on their disbandment, and guaranteed that the government would take no steps to deprive
them of their civil or legal rights.
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nation, this enforcement was by an officer appointed by the central govern-
ment. The Blancos received the right to nominate these Jefes Politicos,
Departmental political chiefs, in their six Departments. These Departments
can be characterized loosely as those in which stock raising was and is of
great economic importance, and in which the large ranch is a typical form
of land tenure.8 The settlements can thus be interpreted as modi vivendi,
compromises of convenience for the preservation of the social and economic
integrity of a group which felt itself bound to suffer under majoritarian
rule. The group tended then, and tends in 1954, to view itself as the
repository of values no longer held by the majority. The position is stated
succinctly by one Uruguayan writer:
A Blanco congress, convened after 1904, in order to adopt policies and attitudes, recog-
nizes and declares, with pride in itself and scorn for the opposition, that the nacionar
lists represent the gentlemanly, pure-blooded, and patrician tradition of Uruguay, while
the colorados are the party o the immigrants 9
The allocation of territorial control came to an end after the civil
war of 1904/° in which a military victory was won by the government.
Within a short time, the carefully erected legal basis for a split nation
came to an end. Uruguay’s political history since that time has been more
conventional. But the institution of the political pact remains.
The pact of the parties has been used both for and against constitu-
tional government. Some pacts have been mere working agreements
whereby laws and constitutional amendments have been written by mutual
consent and compromise. But others have created situations in which
two principal holders of power combine to exclude from participation in
government all with whom there is disagreement. The pact of the parties,
on occasion, has been employed constitutionally to ratify naked power grabs.
In order to undo its effects, domestic peace has been broken twice since
1904 by coups.&dquo;
8 In the negotiations of 1897, the Blancos bid initially for the control of eight Departments. The
statistics in the table below are from Russell Fitzgibbon, Uruguay, Portrait of a Democracy (New
Brunswick, 1954), 55. Professor Fitzgibbon has developed these data from official Uruguayan esti-
mates of 1944. Extrapolation of official estimates indicates that Uruguay’s total population in
1897 was perhaps 700,000, or 30% of that of 1944. 
9 Alberto Zum Felde, Evoluci&oacute;n hist&oacute;rica del Uruguay (3rd ed.; Montevideo, 1945), 224-225. Italics are
Zum Felde’s.
10 The blame for precipitating the conflict has never been definitively assigned, but it is safe to assume
that war certainly would have come. The years 1897-1904 witnessed, at best, what was only an
armed truce. See Pivel Devoto, Hist&oacute;ria de la R. O. del Uruguay, 538-542; Justino Zavala M&uacute;niz,
Batlle. heroe civil (Mexico, 1945), 166-171; Eduardo Acevedo, op. cit., VI, 259-279.
11 See this author, "The Uruguayan Coup d’Etat of 1933," The Hispanic American Historical Review.
XXXII, 301-320 (August, 1952).
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If the pact of the parties were left with this condemnation, it could
be assumed that governmental power has frequently been seized and
controlled by skulduggery, and that the nation has not benefited very
much. But this would be a misstatement. Pacts have allowed the Blancos,
as well as other opposition groups, sufficient political freedom and entr6e
into bureaucratic, legislative, and, on occasion, executive positions, to enable
these groups to support the government. From the vantage point of Latin
American history, we can see that this is a feat of no little importance.
It has permitted the development of extensive personal and group freedoms.
It has even tended to produce a Latin American anomaly: a government
in which the Executive Power is not necessarily predominant .12
II
The constitution of 1952 incorporates few principles that are new to
Uruguay, although its length makes it at least the equal of the justly famed
Mexican constitution of 1917. The plural Executive or Colegiado, the
National Council of Government, has evoked interest and curiosity among
students of government. The creation of this council is, in fact, the
principal reason for this second revision of the document of 1934 .13 Its
existence is the result of another pact of the parties.
The Colegiado became a serious political issue in 1913. Jos6 Batlle y
Ordófíez became impressed with the idea of a plural executive as a solution
to the perennial Latin American problem of caudillismo (&dquo;leaderism&dquo;).
It is by no means clear whether he proposed a collegiate because he thought
it would frustrate the institution of caudillismo, or because he thought
it would be a place to which a caudillo would gravitate. He submitted the
subject to public debate in a newspaper interview; it remains a live issue
today. 14 One writer on the debate has written, &dquo;The original sin of the
project was its paternity,&dquo; 15 for Batlle was truly one of the last of Uruguay’s
12 Even with the unipersonal presidency of the 1942 constitution, it was by no means clear that the
president would be the unchallenged boss of the nation. See this author, The Executive Power in
Uruguay (Berkeley, 1951), 18-25. The 1952 document seems to weaken the Executive Power in a
number of ways. This will increase the contrast between Uruguay on the one hand and Mexico
and Argentina on the other. Regarding this aspect of these two nations see Frank Tannenbaum,
Mexico, the Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York, 1950), 83-91; and George Blanksten, Peron’s
Argentina (Chicago, 1953), 111-157.
13 The constitution of 1942 is viewed by some writers as only a revision of the 1934 document, and the
1952 constitution as a revision of the 1942 version. To a large extent this is true. See Russell
H. Fitzgibbon and others (translators), The Constitutions of the Americas (Chicago, 1948), 713-714.
14 Batlle’s statement was made in El Dia (Montevideo) of March 4, 1913. But many writers argue that
he did not originate it. Jos&eacute; Luciano Mart&iacute;nez, in Gabriel Terra, el hombre, el politico, el
gobernante (Montevideo, 1937), II, 178, states that Batlle’s inspiration came from a draft constitu-
tion written in 1812 for the United Provinces of the Rio Plata (the predecessor of the present
Argentina). Luciano quotes Batlle as saying, "... with minor changes ... it could be used
in Uruguay." 
The matter had been discussed previously by two other persons in Uruguay. Martin Aguirre
proposed a colegial executive in the Ateneo of Montevideo in 1903. See Juan E. Pivel Devoto,
Uruguay Independiente (Barcelona, 1949), 622. Jos&eacute; Espalter, a member of the General Assembly,
discussed the idea in a pamphlet in 1904. See Espalter, Discursos Parlementarios (Montevideo,
1942), VIII, 427-429.
15 Antuna, op. cit., 33.
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great caudillos. It created schisms within the Colorado party that have
never fully healed.
A constitutional convention met in 1917. Batlle’s supporters found
themselves in a minority position, although they still controlled the
General Assembly. For a time there was a genuine fear of civil war.
But the middle-of-the-road newspaper Dicr,rio del Plate proposed a pact
between the major parties, and this occurred.16 The result was a queerly
hybridized Executive, really satisfactory to few.17 Responsibility was so
decentralized that, when economic crisis developed in 1932 and 1933,
the government was helpless to marshal its forces to meet it.l$ Factionalism
developed around two prominent party leaders, one of them the president,
Gabriel Terra. The other was the highly ambitious Blanco leader, Luis
Alberto de Herrera. It became apparent that the two had lost their control
of a majority of the legislature. A pact concerning control of the national
bureaucracy, which had been formalized in law in 1931, came to be used
against Terra’s government Ultimately, Terra overthrew the government
by force, and he and Herrera made a pact of their own, one more repre-
hensible than anything that had preceded it.2o
The 1934 constitution allowed a return to the single Executive ofhcer.
But the price was a Senate equally divided between the two groups backing
Herrera and Terra.21 Terra remained as president, and was able to pervert
the constitutional structure to his own purpose. Ultimately, this action
provoked its own reaction, and Terra’s successor, Alfredo Baldomir,
destroyed the government by his coup of February, 1942.
There followed a period of nearly a decade during which the pact
of the parties was employed in ways which would be more understandable
to United States politicians. The two major parties collaborated at times,
16 Batlle’s supporters had ridiculed the opposition during the campaign. For the first time in Uruguayan
history, the vote was secret. Many former nonvoters turned out. See Ram&iacute;rez, op. cit., 90-92;
Zavala M&uacute;niz, op. cit., 215-219; Roberto Giudici, Batlle y el Batllismo (Montevideo, 1928), 493-494.
The results of the voting are found in Eduardo Acevedo, op. cit., VII, 8.
17 A popularly elected President of the Republic served a four year term; he controlled foreign affairs,
the armed services, and the police. There was also a National Council of Administration of
nine members, elected by thirds each two years; the Council controlled other governmental
functions, including the budget. The Constitution of 1918, arts. 70-104. The debates in the
constitutional convention of 1917 concerning the Executive are in Uruguay, Diario de sesiones
de la Honorable Convenci&oacute;n Nacional Constituente de la Rep&uacute;blica Oriental del Uruguay (Monte-
video, 1917), III, 165.168ff.
18 See Aquiles Espalter, Algunos aspectos de la organizaci&oacute;n del Poder Ejecutivo en la constituci&oacute;n de
1934, y el r&eacute;gimen del ministerio de las mayorias (Montevideo, 1937), 21-25, for an attack on the
capacity of the Colegiado.
Economic trends during the period are discussed in Eduardo Acevedo, op. cit., VII, 303-362,
447-550; and Simon Hanson, Utopia in Uruguay (New York, 1938), 229; and Eduardo Acevedo
Alvarez, La economia y las finanzas p&uacute;blicas despues del 31 de Marzo (Montevideo, 1937).
19 The pact was contained in Law 8765, October 15, 1931 (1931 Registro de leyes de la Rep&uacute;blica Oriental
del Uruguay, 577), which Terra later dubbed el Pacto del Chinchul&iacute;n (literally, the pact of the
pork barrel). The law originally had been passed with Terra’s approval and support, and he did
not turn against it until it began to be used against him by his opponents. See Gustavo Gallinal,
El Uruguay hacia la dictadura (Montevideo, 1938), 187-221, for a general discussion of this event.
20 This phase of Uruguayan political history is discussed in this author’s article, "The Uruguayan
Coup d’Etat of 1933," op. cit.
21 Art. 86 of the document provided that 15 members of the Senate should be assigned to each of the
two leading parties in a Senatorial election. Terra and Herrera were helped to get control of the
General Assembly by the electoral abstention of their opponents.
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but seldom to the exclusion of the numerous minor groups which exist
by virtue of the use of proportional representation in national and local
elections. The Batllista faction of the Colorado party continued to press
for the readoption of the plural Executive, although this was not always
uppermost in its platform. The general elections of 1942, 1946, and 1950
were disappointing to the Blancos, because they showed considerable
continuing strength on the part of the Colorados.22 The Batllistas dis-
paraged proportional representation because they realized that a single-
member district system would give more positive control of the legislature
to them and to the Colorado party.23
Finally, Herrera and the president, now Andr6s Martinez Trueba,
a Batllista, agreed in July, 1951, to the establishment of a nine-man
Executive body entitled the National Council of Government.24 Its mem-
bership is renewed every four years; six seats are apportioned to the &dquo;most-
voted&dquo; party. Direct re-election of Councilors is forbidden. They jointly
appoint nine ministers who carry on the administrative work of govern-
ment. The presidency of the Council rotates annually among members
of the majority party, and the occupant of the office is the formal chief
of the State.25 The new constitution contains other unique provisions, in-
cluding a serious effort to establish a civil service classification and tenure
system, greater local self-government, and assured fiscal regularity.26
III
It is difficult to see that the new Colegiado will serve any useful
purpose. Under the 1942 constitution’s articles 174-176, it had been im-
plied clearly that the president could admit his ministers to virtually equal
responsibility and authority in the determination and conduct of public
policy; thus could have been formed an effective colegiate. Whether or
not this was done depended on the personality of the individual president. 27
The new document merely transfers the powers previously entrusted to the
22 VOTES CAST IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND PERCENTAGES
RECEIVED BY PRINCIPAL PARTIES
Sources: Julio Fabregat, Elecciones Uruguayas (2d ed.; Montevideo, 1948), IX, 8; and Fabregat,
Elecciones Uruguayas (3d ed.; Montevideo, 1953), 6-8.
23 An interpellation of the Subsecretary of the Ministry of the Interior in the Chamber of Representatives,
on August 20-21, 1948, produced a review of the arguments in this matter. See Uruguay, 475 Diario
de la C&aacute;mera de Representantes de la Rep&uacute;blica Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo, 1948), 318 ff.
24 For a summarization of the terms of the agreement, see George Pendle, Uruguay, South America’s First
Welfare State (London, 1952), 24-25. Also, Milton I. Vanger, "Uruguay Introduces Government by
Committee," The American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June, 1954), 502-509.
25 Constitution of 1952, arts. 149-151, 153, 158, 167, 174.
26 Ibid., arts. 58,63, 262-273, and 208-213 respectively. Uruguay’s leading constitutional commentator,
Justino Jim&eacute;nez de Ar&eacute;chaga, is somewhat critical of many of these provisions, however. See his
four-volume work, La Constituci&oacute;n de 1952 (Montevideo, 1953).
27 This author, The Executive Power in Uruguay, op. cit., 21-22.
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president to nine men, incapable of giving policy directives individually.2$
It would appear that Uruguay has re-established an Executive whose
capacity for rapid and effective action in a crisis is open to some question.
One challenge to the government has occurred so far, a general strike.
The somewhat conservative Colegiado met this by unanimous action.
The strike was illegal, in part, because it began among government em-
ployees, who are forbidden to strike. While Uruguayans who support
the Colegiado feel that this action sets a precedent for the future, its
opponents doubt this. Further, the collapse in 1933 of the previous colegial
government occurred because of inability to act in a positive fashion;
negative action, such as strikebreaking, is frequently easier to accomplish. 29
Opponents of the Colegiado claim that it is not supported whole-
heartedly by the people. They question the significance of the plebiscite,
in which a scant 9 per cent of the total population of the nation ratified
the new constitution.3° They contend that the plural membership and the
secrecy in the making of policy decisions are conducive to irresponsibility.
Critics of the emergency measures of September, 1952, have stated that
these would not have been made by a single, obviously responsible
president.31
Other opponents of the new system argue that Uruguay has once
again fallen victim to the pact of the parties.32 Herrera and his party,
who were excluded from participation in the Executive by the 1934 con-
stitution, are readmitted to participation. So long as the two major party
groups and leaders co-operate, the government will probably continue to
operate without difficulty. Party discipline is sufficiently strong to assure
that legislative members will generally do the bidding of the respective
28 Art. 167, par. 2 of the new constitution states, "The National Councillors may not, individually, give
orders of any kind." Decisions are, in fact, being made by joint decision of the colegiate, and
with joint responsibility observed.
29 The preceding government, that of Luis Batlle Berres, had been sympathetic to labor. It has been
alleged that his supporters encouraged strikes, illegal or not, in order to force the government
bodies which control wage rates in a number of enterprises to approve raises. The supporters of
this line of reasoning state that the 10,000 transit workers in the municipally owned streetcar and
bus system of Montevideo expected such suppport when they struck in September, 1952. It was
not forthcoming, and a general sympathy strike ensued.
The Colegiado justified its action against the strike by noting the arrival of an Argentine
agitator in a shoe factory which was on sympathy strike; a state of emergency was declared under
art. 168, par. 17 of the constitution. The movement was abandoned. New York Times, September
12-23 and December 18, 1952; Visi&oacute;n, October 3 and November 28, 1952.
30 1,168,876 were registered to vote. Article 281 (B) of the 1942 constitution provided that amending
plebiscites required at least a 35% turnout of this number (408,872). In fact, 36.7% did vote
(429,760), and 54.0% of the votes favored the new document (232,076). Thus, 19.8% of the regis-
tered voters voted for the new constitution, a figure equal to not more than 9% of the total
population. Fabregat (3rd ed.), op. cit., 1-2; and New York Times, December 17, 1951.
The campaign prior to the plebiscite had been heated, with the Batllista wing of the Colorado
party (the dominant wing) badly split, and with students at the University striking in protest
against its provisions concerning the National University. Labor union opposition, led by former
president Batlle Berres, produced a majority against the ratification in Montevideo of 33,624. All
other Departments returned a favorable majority, however. See Uruguay, Electoral Court, Circular
No. 3010 (Montevideo, January 17, 1952), and New York Times, loc. cit.
31 Visi&oacute;n, October 3, 1952.
32 See the Washington Post, January 5, 1952, for a letter from a Montevideo resident criticizing the
new constitution.
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party directorates.33 But Herrera is in his 80’s, and his retirement is hope-
fully anticipated (by many of his own followers!) in the near future. Will
the successors of Herrera and Martinez Trueba be able to work together
in what could well be a delicately balanced situation? It was, after all,
the failure of the parties to work together in 1933 in the face of crisis and
heightened personalist tensions that brought on the downfall of the
previous Colegiado. Former president Luis Batlle Berres, who aspires to
continuance in power, has made clear his great dissatisfaction with the
Colegiado. He argues that, while the Batllistas have long favored a
&dquo;pluripersonal&dquo; executive, they have not favored a body composed of
members of many parties. His opposition, expressed in the campaign
preceding the plebiscite in 1951, has become more open in preparation
for the general elections of November 28, 1954.34 It seems clear that there
will be two leading issues before the voters in the forthcoming campaign:
the retention of the presently organized Colegiado, and the position of
Batlle Berres himself.
In preparation for the January, 1954, Colorado party convention,
Batlle Berres made his own position clear. His opponents within the
Batllista wing, led by Cesar Batlle Pacheco, the late Battle y Ordonez’ son,
advocated a slate of executive candidates composed of supporters of both
wings. Batlle Berres urged the convention to designate two slates, each
to be composed entirely of supporters of each of the two men. In effect,
he is playing for five seats in the Colegiado rather than the two or three
he would otherwise get. The convention followed Batlle Pacheco, but
Batlle Berres remains determined.35 It is improbable that under present
circumstances he could establish himself as a dictator, but his predilection
for power seems apparent from the record. The present balance of pro-
and anti-colegial forces would probably preclude an immediate effort on his
part to revise the constitution further. But the voters will have a clear
choice before them.
In the short run, it seems unlikely that Uruguay will feel the high
pitch of economic pressures which toppled the colegiate of 1918-1933. But
the force of a new caudillo or, equally likely, a new depression could upset
the balance. Uruguay depends heavily for its economic well-being on
international trade, the bulk of its exports falling in the categories of meat
33 Discipline within the highly-institutionalized Colorado party, especially in its Batllista wing, has
enabled it to operate effectively on many occasions in the past. Herrera, the Blanco leader,
exercises as positive a personal leadership over his followers as almost any Latin American caudillo.
Personal observation, Fitzgibbon (Uruguay, Porttait....), op. cit., and Vanger, op. cit., concur
in this respect.
34 Visi&oacute;n, May 13, June 10, and October 3, 1952; November 13, 1953.
35 Visi&oacute;n, November 13, 1953, and El Bien P&uacute;blico (Montevideo, July 27, 1954).
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and grain. Although its inflation, even by United States standards, is not
serious, strikes and continued demands for wage raises cause concern.3s
A more serious criticism can be made of the pact of 1951. The Pacto
del Chinchulin of 1931 established in law the principle that bureaucratic
employment should be apportioned among all the parties in rough propor-
tion to their strength in the preceding election. This was not a new
principle in Uruguayan civil service practice.37 It would seem, on the basis
of interviews by the writer with Uruguayans of opposing parties, that this
has become a thing of the past, and that nearly all new government em-
ployees are hired only from the two major parties.
Nine men now perform the work of one. They do not actually head
the executive departments of the government; for ministers, appointed in
rough proportion to the apportionment of colegiate seats among the various
parties, head these departments as formerly. On the surface it appears
decidedly easier to censure the ministers.3$ But the ministers now have nine
bosses; this situation seems unenviable. Further, eighteen persons are con-
cerned with executive policy, rather than the former ten. This situation
also seems to admit of confusion.
Proportional representation has been a feature of the electoral system
since its adoption for the Chamber of Representatives in 1918.3g Subsequent
developments have extended its use. A Montevideo voter will choose
from among fifty or so lists of legislative candidates at the quadrennial
election. But within a few days, there will be a return to the basic pattern
of three principal parties or lemas, with the Colorado party containing
three fractions or sub-lemas. This writer theorizes that this has taken place
in the past because of the popular election of the president. A nation-wide
political machine has been necessary to assure that both the election and
a working legislative majority would accrue to a single individual. In
36 Visi&oacute;n: May 13 and October 3, 1952. Also, Chase National Bank of New York, Latin American
Business Highlights, June, 1952, pp. 26-27; June, 1953, pp. 22-23; and December, 1953, p. 23.
The New York Times, January 6, 1954, p. 49, presents the most up-to-date picture of the numerous
inflationary pressures, some of them induced by the administration of Batlle Berres.
Vision, May 13, 1952, quotes "an Uruguayan diplomat": "In Batllismo there was a fear that
one fine day there would appear a man, that he would make himself president; and, with the
power in his hands, the Batllistas would be forgotten."
37 By way of example, the Electoral Court is a quasi-judicial body which regulates all Uruguayan elections.
It supervises several hundred employees. Within three weeks of its establishment in 1924, the
Court determined that its employees would be hired on the basis outlined above. See Jim&eacute;nez de
Ar&eacute;chaga, La Constituci&oacute;n Nacional (Montevideo, 1949), X, 124-125; see also Julio T. Fabregat,
Los Partidos pol&iacute;ticos en la legislaci&oacute;n uruguaya (Montevideo, 1949), 135-139.
38 Arts. 136-144 of the 1942 constitution dealt with legislative censure of the ministers. Censure was so
difficult, mechanically, that it never occurred; rather, in a number of instances, ministers resigned
after vigorous interpellation resulted in what was known as "implied censure." See this author,
"The Executive Power in Uruguay," op. cit., 39-40.
Arts. 147-150 of the 1952 constitution also deal with censure. Either chamber of the General
Assembly may propose it, and a joint session’s absolute majority vote suffices to force immediate
ministerial resignation.
39 1918 constitution, art. 19, stated that this Chamber would be elected as a subsequent electoral law
would direct. Transitory art. "C" provided that the law of September 1, 1915 (1915 Registro ...
de leyes ... del Uruguay 630-643) would be applicable in the interim. Art. 50 of the law provided
for distribution of seats in the constitutional convention proportional to the vote count for the
various parties. It was not until the passage of the Election Law of January 16, 1925, ibid., 27-59,
that a general revision of the election law was accomplished. See Jim&eacute;nez de Ar&eacute;chaga, op. cit.,
III, 85 ff.
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short, the popular election of the president has had a &dquo;polarizing&dquo; effect on
the parties. It would seem that the election of the Colegiado will produce
similar results. The assignment of six seats to the victorious party will
assure lively party organizations, and the assignment of three seats to the
next party should assure an effective opposition party. The theory seems
borne out in the circumstances of the present campaign, for, while there
is intense competition for power by Batlle Berres, there is as yet no indica-
tion that he proposes to bolt the Batllista wing of the Colorado party.
The Blancos, too, are effective. In fact, it may logically be conjectured that
they are the world’s longest-lived opposition party: eighty-six years in that
position with only scant fruits of victory! It is worthy of note that both
parties support the constitutional order in general, and accept the extensive
government economic activity which stamps Uruguay as a thoroughgoing
socialist nation.
The re-creation of the Colegiado has re-admitted the Blancos to
participation in the executive’s policy-making and executing role. In view
of this party’s long-time electoral weakness, this is perhaps desirable. A
slight impairment of executive efficiency, for the moment, may well be
overbalanced by the sense of broadened popular participation in policy
decisions. Eighty per cent of the electorate are now represented by the
officers who make policy decisions. This is not bad, especially in view of
Latin America’s dictator-haunted past. There seems some justification for
the comment, &dquo;With the colegial system, a deathblow has been delivered
to demagogy. 11 40 Yet it seems undeniable that demagogy will be an issue
of some importance in the coming election.
Beyond this, another point is worth considering. Constitutions pre-
suming to be democratic are ineffective unless, in some way, they receive
philosophical and emotional support from the governed. For too long,
Latin America labored under forms of government copied unthinkingly
from other nations. The art of government demands thoughtful experi-
mentation and development to reach its most effective expression, and the
Colegiado may well be considered Uruguay’s contribution to such develop-
ment. Superficially, a record of four constitutional reforms in thirty-four
years does not indicate stability. But the new change indicates a sincere
effort to reach a degree of political peace and real national unity. The
pact of the parties has contributed materially to this end. In a very real
sense, Uruguayans view their nation as a laboratory.
40 Visi&oacute;n, May 13, 1952.
